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Who is "I"? Pronoun Choice and Bilingual Identity in 
Court Interpreting · 
Philipp Sebastian Angermeyer 
1 Introduction 
In situations of language contact, interpreters often play a crucial role in fa-
cilitating interactions between members of different language communities. 
As pointed out by Valdes and Angelelli (2003: 58), "interpreters are indi-
viduals who, as the locus of language contact, have much to teach us about 
the nature of this contact and about the characteristics of bilingual individu-
als who broker interactions between monolingual members of groups in 
contact." 
When interpreters broker interactions between monolinguals, they 
translate and represent the speech of others, and by doing so, they inevitably 
take stances towards these individuals. Arguably, these stances also reflect 
the interpreters' attitudes towards the respective communities. In this paper, I 
investigate the ways in which interpreters mark their stances towards others 
linguistically and how this may be taken to reflect their identity as bilinguals 
in an interethnic interaction. 
2 Court Interpreting 
Interpreting has increasingly become the subject of linguistic research. While 
interpreting studies have traditionally focused on conference interpreting 
(Pochhacker 2004: 30-6), a growing body of research in discourse analysis 
and sociolinguistics has studied interpreting in face-to- face interactions, in a 
variety of contexts, from hospitals to political-asylum interviews (Berk-
Seligson 1990, Wadensjo 1998, Roy 2000, Davidson 2000, Meyer 2004, 
Hale 2004). From a sociolinguistic perspective, court interpreting represents 
an especially fruitful ground for research, because in court interpreting, the 
social inequality between language communities is mirrored by the relative 
status that the languages have in the courtroom. 
O'Barr and Atkins (1980) famously identified that a speech style which 
*This material is based upon work supported by the National Science Foundation 
under Grant No. BCS-0317838. I'm grateful to John Victor Singler and Anna Marie 
Trester as well as to many participants of NWAV 33 for their comments and sugges-
tions. All errors and omissions are my own. 
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they called "powerless language" caused witnesses to be perceived nega-
tively by jurors. Since then, sociolinguists have been acutely aware of the 
role of linguistic variation in the courtroom and of its potential social and 
legal implications. Therefore, studies of court interpreting have often been 
conducted with the aim of assessing the degree to which interpreter perform-
ance has an effect on the outcome of a trial. Most notably, Berk-Seligson 
(1990) built on O'Barr's and Atkins's (1980) findings by showing in ex-
periments with mock jurors that the perception of a person who is being in-
terpreted is affected by the interpreter's speech style. 
3 Variation in Interpreters' Speech Style 
One aspect of interpreters' speech style that has received particular attention 
from linguists as well as from authors writing from a legal perspective is the 
question whether interpreters translate another person's speech in the first 
person or in the third person. In other words do they speak as the person 
whose speech they are translating, or do they speak about him or her? For 
example, if a male witness says in Spanish Yo jura decir la verdad, the in-
terpreter could translate this as I swear to tell the truth. But alternatively, the 
interpreter could say He swears to tell the truth, or could even use reported 
speech by saying He says he swears to tell the truth. 
Obviously, these variants give quite different impressions of what was 
said, and of the interpreter's stance toward the source speaker. As a result, 
this is a variable that has received a lot of attention from people writing 
about interpreting, even though, to my knowledge, it has not been ap-
proached from a variationist perspective. 
From the perspective of the American legal system, there are very clear 
institutional norms in this respect. The interpreter is viewed as a conduit who 
is supposed to translate verbatim everything that is being said. This has im-
portant legal implications, for example, in official transcripts of trials, which 
do not include utterances made in a language other than English. Instead, the 
voice of the interpreter has become the voice of the person whose speech is 
being translated. Consequently, guidebooks for interpreters emphasize that 
interpreters should always use first person to refer to the person for whom 
they are translating (e.g. Edwards 1995: 83, Colin and Morris 1996: 146). 
Likewise, Berk-Seligson (1990: 53-4) states that the interpreter should be 
"invisible" and "should not exist as a verbal participant in her own right," 
speaking "solely in place of the other participants." To use Goffman's (1981: 
144) terminology of speaker roles, this ideal interpreter is only the animator 
of the translated utterances, but not the author or the principal. 
However, the speaker roles change when interpreters use reported 
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speech, and refer to a source speaker in the third person. In these cases, we 
can speak with Bakhtin (1981: 324) of a double-voiced discourse that 
"serves two speakers at the same time and expresses simultaneously two 
different intentions," namely the intention of the translated source speaker, 
as well as that of the interpreter him- or herself. This use of third person is 
criticized as unprofessional behavior by legal and educational observers (see 
Pochhacker 2004: 151-2), as well as by some linguists (e.g. Berk-Seligson 
1990: 65). Wadensjo (1998: 6-7) refrains from taking such a judgmental po-
sition, problematizing the notion that interpreters can remain neutral at all. 
She views the use of first person as an act of "relaying by replaying" which 
is "re-presenting the whole appearance of another person's utterance" (p. 
19). By contrast, she describes third person reference as "relaying by dis-
playing" that is "presenting the other's words and simultaneously empha-
sizing personal non-involvement in what they voice." 
It follows that the choice of third person reference can be regarded as a 
resource that the interpreter has for expressing non-involvement with the 
voice of the other. In contrast, the choice of first person reflects either and 
adherence to court norms or involvement with the speaker (or both). 1 Thus 
we can ask as sociolinguists when it is that interpreters signal their non-
involvement with another voice. Which speakers do interpreters identify 
with, and which speakers they do not identify with? And what can that tell us 
about the identity of court interpreters as bilinguals who are brokering be-
tween members of different linguistic communities in a situation of conflict? 
To answer these questions, I have conducted a quantitative analysis of this 
variation in the speech of interpreters, based on data gathered from court 
interpreters in New York City. 
4 Data 
This study is based on extensive fieldwork which I conducted in three Small 
Claims Courts in New York City. These courts deal with civil lawsuits in-
volving claims of up to $5,000. Most cases are heard and decided by arbi-
trators (volunteering lawyers), and most people suing or being sued are not 
represented by attorneys. Most importantly, arbitration differs from other 
court settings in that it is relatively informal. At times, this informality leads 
interpreters, who are provided by the court, to engage in activities that go 
beyond translation, from administrative tasks for the court to coaching of 
non-English-speaking litigants. Furthermore, because of the informality of 
1For example, Lang (1976: 338) sees the first person usage as incompatible with 
an interpreter assumjng the role of an intermediary. 
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arbitration, the interpreter's speech is less regulated and less supervised than 
it would be in a formal trial. 
Typical cases brought to Small Claims Court involve claims for out-
standing payments or reimbursements. Most commonly, they are brought by 
tenants suing former landlords for the return of a security deposit; by work-
ers suing former employers for outstanding wages; by consumers suing busi-
nesses for refunds ; or by individuals suing another for compensation for 
damages (e.g. car accident). In these cases, the person suing is very often 
someone who is economica11y disadvantaged compared to the person being 
sued. In cases with an interpreter, it is usua1ly the person suing who speaks a 
language other than English (LOTE, cf. Garcia 1997), while the person being 
sued usually does speak English. 
During my fieldwork I recorded 52 court proceedings that included in-
terpreters for Spanish, Russian, Polish, or Haitian Creole. The results pre-
sented in this paper are based on a subset of ten hearings, with six different 
interpreters. The hearings were transcribed and each turn by an interpreter 
was coded for the way in which it represented the speech of a translated par-
ticipant.2 
Type of reference Tokens 
1st person reference 299 (67%) (see exam_Q].e 1) 
3rd person reference 71 (16%) (see example 2) 
No reference to the speaker 73 (16%) (see example 3) 
Type of reference unclear 6 (1 %) (e.g. necesitaba ' I/he needed ') 
TOTAL 449 
- - --- -- ----- -- -- -
Table 1: Interpreter turns translating a source-speaker utterance with first 
person reference to the speaker. 
As tokens, I counted all turns by an interpreter that were a translation of an 
utterance whose speaker had used first person. I used turns as a unit of 
analysis, because I assumed that choice of reference would be consistent 
within turns. This was almost always the case, except for a few very long 
turns.3 All in a11, the ten court proceedings considered in this study co ntained 
2Transcribing was done in collaboration with assistants who were native or near-
native in the respective languages. 
3Tums can be identified straightforwardly during consecutive interpreting, 
which occurs whenever interpreters translate between speaker and addressee. How-
ever, turns are harder to identify when interpreters translate simultaneously , which is 
usually found when interpreters translate talk between two English speakers for the 
benefit of a non-English-speaking overhearer. Simultaneous interpreting is not part of 
WHO IS "I'? 35 
449 such tokens. As shown in table 1, 67 percent of the tokens were in the 
first person, and 16 percent each were in the third person or avoided a per-
son-reference to the source speaker. 
An example for a first person token is given in (1), from a hearing with a 
Russian interpreter, a case about a car accident. 
( 1) Source 1st -- Translation 1 st4 
1 Defendant: Ja exal po Coney lsi [//] po Kings Highway. 
{'I was going on Coney Island-- Kings Highway.'} 
2 Interpreter: So what happened was, 
3 l was riding down ah Kings Highway. 
As can be seen, the defendant uses the Russian 1st person subject pronoun ja 
in line 1, which the interpreter renders as I in line 3. An example for a third 
person token is given in (2), from a hearing with a Polish interpreter. The 
excerpt is from a case in which two workers were suing a restaurant owner 
for outstanding wages. 
(2) Source 1st-- Translation 3rd 
1 Arbitrator: Okay. And what kind of work do you do? 
2 Interpreter: # J ak~ pracy wyscie robili tam? 
{'what job did you do over there?'} 
3 Claimant B: # Pierogi (i blintze). 
4 Claimant A: ~ robily pierogi i blintze. 
{'we made pierogies and blintzes'} 
5 Interpreter: They did blintzes 
6 rand # pierogies. 
7 Arbitrator: Loh, she's a cook? 
In (2), one of the two claimants uses the Polish 1st person plural subject pro-
noun my in line 4, but the interpreter translates it as they in line 5. This ex-
ample also illustrates the way in which the interpreter's stance interacts with 
that of the other participants. In line 1, the arbitrator addresses the claimant 
as you, but then, after the interpreter has used third person in line 5, the arbi-
the same conversational floor as the source talk, i.e. English speakers do not pause 
for an interpreter's turn. Thus, in simultaneous interpreting, interpreter turns were 
identified on the basis of their correspondence to source turns. 
~ranscription conventions: #brief pause, /emphasis, (unclear segment), (xxx) 
inaudible segment, roverlap, [//] retracing with correction, +1. interrupted utterance, 
{'English translation'}. 
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trator also talks about her instead of to her, as he says Oh she's a cook, in 
line 7. This phenomenon, that English-speakers treat the interpreter as the 
addressee rather than the person who is being interpreted, has been described 
by Urciuoli (1996). In general, it is not characteristic of the arbitrators in my 
sample, but it is fairly common in the speech of attorneys, in cases where 
one side is represented by a lawyer, but the interpreted person is not. 
Example 3 illustrates a case where the interpreter avoids a person-
reference altogether. This time it is a translation from English, and the 
Spanish interpreter translates my decision as la decision, the decision. 
(3) Source lst-- Translation 0-reference 
1 Arbitrator: You' 11 get I!!Y decision in the mail. 
2 Interpreter: Okay, f}Q decision llegani por correo. 
{'the decision will arrive by mail'} 
3 Claimant: lNo +1. 
In (3), it appears that the interpreter avoids first-person so as to signal his 
personal non-involvement with the legal decision making. This behavior in 
(3) is characteristic of many interpreters that I observed and it corresponds to 
an observation by Berk-Seligson (1990: 115), who states that it is "particu-
larly common" for interpreters to avoid the subject pronoun I "in the inter-
pretation of judges' speech to defendants, especially during the time of sen-
tencing." 
5 Results and Discussion 
To identify the factors that condition the variation between types of reference 
in the speech of interpreters, I conducted a multivariate analysis using Gold-
varb. While each type was analyzed separately, I focus on the use of third 
person reference in this paper. The results are shown in table 2. Two factor 
groups were significant, namely who the interpreter is and whose speech is 
being translated. 
As can be seen in table 2, there are significant differences between the 
six interpreters when it comes to using third person reference in translation. 
One of them, Javier, a Spanish interpreter, doesn't use third person at all. 5 
Three other interpreters use it comparatively rarely, but two interpreters use 
it more than 40% of the time, namely Yves, a Haitian Creole interpreter, and 
Jerzy, a Polish interpreter. 
5 All names are pseudonyms. 
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Factor Weight Percent n 
Intemreter (Language} 
Jerzy (Polish) .897 44% 34178 
Yves (Haitian Creole) .824 40% 24/60 
Igor (Russian) .478 11% 8171 
Juan (Spanish) .217 5% 4/81 
Irina (Russian) .088 2% 1165 
Javier (Spanish) k.o. 0% (0/88) 
Intemreted narticinant 
English-speaking litigant .752 34% 33/97 
Arbitrator .744 27% 26/94 
LOTE-speaking litigant .220 7% 121164 
Total: Input .089 20% 71/355 
Log likelihood = -116.639 Significance = 0.000 
Table 2: Goldvarb results, use of third person in translating utterances with 
first person reference to the speaker 
What accounts for the differences between interpreters shown in table 2? As 
only one or two hearings were considered for each interpreter, it is possible 
that the circumstances of a particular case led an interpreter to stray from the 
institutional norm. Nevertheless, some generalizations can be made. 
All interpreters in this sample are state-certified court interpreters, that is 
they have received a certain amount of training, which includes the instruc-
tion to use first person reference. However, they differ with respect to their 
status at court, as some interpreters are full-time staff members, while others 
are employed on a part time basis. The three interpreters who use third per-
son reference the least (Irina, Juan, and Javier), are all staff interpreters who 
are employed by a particular courthouse. By contrast, Jerzy, the interpreter 
who uses third person reference the most, is a part-time freelancer, a so-
called per diem interpreter. He is employed by the court system, but he is 
sent to different courts all over the city, depending on where he might be 
needed. On the day when I recorded him the arbitration hearing was the only 
Small Claims case that he interpreted in, and he had specifica1ly traveled to 
the courthouse for it. In contrast, the other interpreters in the sample each 
translated in multiple cases on the days when I recorded them. 6 
6Anker (1991) and lnghilleri (2003) have previously noted that staff interpre ters 
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However, the interpreter factor group cannot be analyzed independently 
of the second significant factor group, namely that of the source speaker who 
is being translated. This is shown in table 3, which represents a cross tabula-
tion of the two factor groups. 
Source- LOTE- English- Arbitrator TOTAL 
speaker speaking speaking 
Interpreter litigant litigant 
Javier 0% (53) N/A 0% (35) 0% (88) 
Irina 0% (31) 0% (6) 4% (28) 2% (65) 
Juan 0% (31) 0% (38) 33% (12) 5% (81) 
Igor 5% (37) 0% (10) 25% (24) 11% (71) 
Yves 4% (23) 65% (23) 57% (14) 40% (60) 
Jerz_y 21% (42) 90% (20) 44% (16) 44% (78) 
TOTAL 6% (217) 34% (97) 20% (129) 16% (443) 
Table 3: Third person usage of interpreters, for groups of source-speakers 
As is evident from tables 2 and 3, the interpreters are generally not likely to 
use third person when they translate the speech of litigants who speak a lan-
guage other than English (LOTE). In this respect, it is important to note that 
the interpreters are all immigrants themselves, that is they are native speak-
ers of the respective LOTE, but generally not of English. Also, they usually 
share an ethnicity with the people they are translating for. This is particularly 
true of the interpreters for Russian, Polish and Haitian Creole, but less so for 
the Spanish interpreters, who often come from different countries than the 
people they are translating for. In any case, if the choice of third person ref-
erence is taken to mean that the interpreter wishes to disassociate him- or 
herself from the translated person, it appears that interpreters generally don't 
see a need to disassociate themselves from the litigants who speak their lan-
guage, and who are often their compatriots. 
Knapp & Knapp-Potthoff (1985: 453) argue that interpreters have a ten-
dency to feel an affinity towards participants who are native speakers of their 
own first language, but also that they may want to come to the aid of a 
weaker party. Both aspects could be relevant here, as they suggest that the 
interpreter is more likely to identify with the non-English-speaking litigant. 
However, it has also been noted, for example by Lang (1976), that interpret-
ers use third person when they act as an advocate for the source-speaker, 
because acting as an advocate requires them to bring in their own voice, re-
are less likely to use third person than are interpreters who are contracted for a spe-
cific case. 
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serving the first person for themselves. This could perhaps explain the com-
paratively high rate of third person usage in Jerzy's translation of the two 
Polish claimants (21 %). During the hearing, there are several instances in 
which he takes on functions of a legal advisor, and where he talks about the 
claimants on their behalf, rather than speaking as them. 7 
In contrast to their translation of LOTE-speaking litigants, the interpret-
ers in the sample are much more likely to use third person when they trans-
late an utterance made by an English speaker. Some interpreters (Irina, Igor 
and Juan) use third person (almost) exclusively when translating the speech 
of the arbitrator. This can be interpreted along the same lines as example (3) 
above, as an attempt to deemphasize their involvement with the decision-
making process. By contrast, Yves and Jerzy, the two interpreters who use 
the third person most, also use it heavily when they translate the voice of an 
English-speaking litigant. In particular, they tend to frame their translation as 
reported speech. This is illustrated in example (4), from a case with a Haitian 
claimant, a customer who wants a refund from a computer store. 
( 4) 1 Defendant: 
2 
3 Interpreter: 
4 Arbitrator: 
5 Interpreter: 
6 
Ah the day we delivered we informed him that ah 
this is not appropriate for a computer to be like this. 
Li di (ah ke) jou ke l te rdelivre ~ ba ou a 
{'he says that the day he delivered'} 
lDid he tell you when he+/. 
lite di ou li pat apropriye 
{'he told you that it was not appropriate'} 
pou te fe 1 konsa. 
{'to be done like this'} 
By using reported speech (line 3) and speaking about the defendant instead 
of assuming his voice, the interpreter is avoiding any personal identification 
with him and his position in the dispute. In this conflict between a Haitian 
man and a West Indian store owner, the Haitian interpreter is making it clear 
7Some Spanish interpreters (university-educated men of Cuban or Argentine 
background) expressed negative opinions to me about some of the litigants they were 
translating for and the varieties of Spanish spoken by them (e.g. Dominican Spanish). 
Thus, it cannot be claimed that they identified with these litigants. However, this lack 
of identification with litigants does not manifest itself in third person usage , pre-
sumably because Spanish interpreters are the most invested in the court and in the 
interpreting norms upheld by it, and thus maintain first person usage when translating 
litigants ' voices into English. This illustrates that, while the use of third person refer-
ence can be understood as an act of distancing, the use of first person does not auto-
matically imply that the interpreter identifies with the source speaker. 
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to his compatriot that he is not taking the opponent ' s side. This use of re-
ported speech thus can be interpreted as a resource for signaling solidarity in 
an interethnic conflict situation. For both Jerzy and Yves it is the default 
form they use when translating the speech of someone who is the opposing 
party of their compatriot. 
The use of third person when translating into the LOTE may also be a 
reflection of community-specific norms of interpreting in settings outside the 
courtroom. For example, Harris (1990: 115-116) claims that third person 
usage is characteristic of non-professional interpreting (see also Valdes 2003 
on child interpreters). In fact, some litigants are confused by verbatim inter-
preting, prompting the interpreter to explain ' 'I'm only translating."8 How-
ever, if this were the only motivation for interpreters to use third person ref-
erence, we would not expect to find different rates of its use in the transla-
tion of arbitrators and opponents, as we do for Jerzy. 9 
However, apart from questions of the interpreter's stances towards the 
other participants, one also needs to consider the direction of translation, i.e. 
whether the interpreter is translating into English or from English. As can be 
seen, the interpreters are far more likely to use third person when they are 
translating from English, into a language that is understood only by the per-
son they are translating for. Their third person usage is therefore not likely to 
be detected by anyone who would recognize it as violating the norms of 
court interpreting. 
This is not quite true for the Spanish interpreters. When they are trans-
lating into Spanish, they may be understood by other participants, as there 
are arbitrators and court staff who understand Spanish. Also, perhaps most 
importantly, the people who supervise and evaluate interpreters at the courts 
are themselves former Spanish interpreters, so that Spanish interpreters are 
subject to more detailed institutional scrutiny than interpreters for other lan-
guages. 
For all interpreters it is true that when they are translating into English, 
third person usage can be noticed by the arbitrator, by other interpreters, or 
8For example, it happens often that litigants think that they are a ddressed when a 
question addressed to the other party is translated verbatim with 2nd person address 
forms. 
9The use of the term solidarity raises the questions whether these acts of di s-
tancing are deliberate or whether interpreters are unaware of their occurrence. While 
it cannot be addressed here, the reported prevalence of third person usage in non-
professional interpreting, as well as the occasional need for interpreters to refer to 
themselves in the first person, suggests that third person translation may be more 
basic, while consistent maintenance of first person translation may require a more 
conscious effort. 
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by anyone else affiliated with the court. Interpreters are conscious of this 
fact, as is evident when they are found to self-correct from third- to first-
person usage, as shown in (5), from the same hearing as example (2). 
(5) 1 Arbitrator: And you worked when he opened the restaurant? 
2 Claimant B: Yes. 
3 Interpreter: Ah, wyscie pracowali od pocz~tku 
{'You were working since the beginning'} 
4 Claimant A: rTak. 
{'Yes.'} 
5 Claimant B: jTak. 
{'Yes.'} 
6 Interpreter: lkiedy on otworzyl restauracj~? 
{'when he opened the restaurant'} 
7 Claimant B: Tak. 
{'Yes.'} 
8 Attorney: f(xxx). 
9 Claimant B: LPoprzednio zesmy pracowali u poprzedniego bossa. 
{'Before we worked for the previous boss.'} 
.......,. 10 Interpreter: They work +1. 
11 Claimant B: Pi~tna§cie lat. 
{'Fifteen years'} 
.......,. 12 We work # /prior to that 
13 Defendant: rcxxx) . 
14 Interpreter: L for [/ /] maybe for fifteen years 
15 prior to the /previous owner. 
In line 12, the interpreter (Jerzy) self-corrects his translation from third per-
son (they work) in line 10, to first person (we work) in line 12. The example 
shows that despite being a freelance interpreter, he is well aware of what is 
expected of him, as his self-correction points towards the institutional 
norm. 10 In my data, there are other examples of such norm-affirming self-
corrections with other interpreters, but they occur only when the translation 
is into English. 
10In one case that was not included in this data sample, another Spanish inte r-
preter was found to self-correct towards third person as he translated testimony by an 
English-speaking litigant into Spanish. This Spanish interpreter was also a heavy user 
of reported speech. His self-correction away from the institutional norm suggests that 
interpreters may also adapt towards what they perceive as the preferences of non-
English-speaking litigants. 
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In this respect it is interesting to note the results for Yves, the Haitian 
Creole interpreter, in table 3. As a staff interpreter, he adheres closely to the 
norms of court interpreting when he translates into English, but does not do 
so at all when he translates from English into Haitian Creole. By using third 
person and reported speech when translating into Haitian Creole, but using 
first person when translating from Haitian Creole into English, he is simulta-
neously able to maintain the appearance of adhering to the institutional 
norms of court interpreting, and to signal solidarity to his fellow Haitian 
immigrants. Yves's speech style is not typical for that of the other interpret-
ers in the sample, but in a way he occupies a middle ground between two 
extreme positions: on the one hand there is Jerzy, who frequently uses third 
person, even when translating into English, and on the other hand, there are 
the four other interpreters who more or less refrain from using third person at 
all, except occasionally when they are translating the voice of the arbitrator, 
thus presumably when they want to signal that they are not responsible for 
the legal decision. 
By occupying this middle ground, Yves ' s interpreting style illustrates 
nicely the way in which interpreters can act as a buffer between the different 
participants, and by extension between the spheres of the different linguistic 
communities that are in contact in the courtroom. Yves is a bilingual who 
knows how to act appropriately in both spheres, projecting the image of a 
professional interpreter in the English-speaking sphere of the court, and at 
the same time acting as an ally to his compatriot in the Haitian Creole-
speaking sphere of Haitian court users. By doing so, he arguably facilitates 
the interaction and contributes to mitigating the conflict. 
6 Conclusion 
In conclusion, this study illustrates how an interpreter may act as intermedi-
ary, transforming the speech of other participants in ways that are socially 
acceptable to the respective target audiences. In doing so interpreters balance 
their own competing allegiances as bilinguals in a multilingual, multiethnic 
society. As the data show, this balance may tilt in either direction, depending 
on an interpreter's investment with the court or with the litigants, though 
some, like Yves, may be able to find a way to signal allegiance to both sides. 
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